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Developments in Lease Law 1992-1993"
Richard D. Moreno-
I. LESSOR'S LIABILITY UNDER CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 2703'
A. Importance Of Defining The Leased Premises2
Defining the leased premises has taken on an important additional meaning
under recent Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence. Until recently, it was
generally believed that the landlord had no duty to protect a lessee from a
disturbance caused by a third person not claiming possession of the leased
premises.. Article 2703 of the Civil Code was believed to compel this conclu-
sion. However, in Potter v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,3 the
Court held that the lessor may be liable for injuries to the lessee caused by third
persons where those injuries are caused in part by a defect in common areas
adjacent to the leased premises.4 The Louisiana Supreme Court further held that
the lessor is protected from liability to the lessee for injuries caused by third
persons not claiming possession only in limited circumstances.' The court held
that:
[a]s a matter of law, article 2703 merely limits the lessor's warranty of
peaceful possession, when the lessor is free from fault, excusing him
from guaranteeing the lessee against disturbances caused by third
persons not claiming any right to the premises. Parenthetically, by
implication it applies only to the property leased to lessee and not to
common areas or areas to which the lessee has only access, but not a
possessory right.
6
Thus, the court imposed two important limitations on the broad immunity
from liability that was previously perceived in earlier interpretations of Article
2703. The first limitation is that the lessor must be free of fault. In Potter, there
were questions of fact concerning whether the lessor had knowledge of, among
Copyright 1994, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
* This article is derived from material prepared for the 1993 (fifth) revision of George M.
Armstrong, Jr., Louisiana Landlord and Tenant Law (Butterworths 1993). Reprinted with permission
from Louisiana Landlord and Tenant Law, Fifth Revision, by G. Armstrong published and
copyrighted 1993 by Butterworth Legal Publishers, a division of Reed Publishing (USA), Inc.
** Member of the Louisiana Bar.
1. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 6.21-6.25, 6.4-6.41, 8.3.
2. See id. § 3.2.
3. Potter v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 615 So. 2d 318 (La. 1993).
4. Id; Roberts v. Orpheum Corp., 610 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616
So. 2d 682 (La. 1993).
5. Potter, 615 So. 2d 318.
6. Id at 325.
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other things, defective lighting and prior criminal activity in the parking areas
where the victim was injured. Secondly, and more importantly, the court
imposed the limitation that Article 2703 is not applicable to "common areas or
areas to which the lessee has only access, but not a possessory right."7
B. Fate of Recent Pre-Potter Cases
The Potter court stated that Reilly v. Fairway View 11 Associates Limited
Partnership8 and other cases reaching similar conclusions "overstate[d] the legal
consequences of article 2703."" As a result, recent pre-Potter cases, such as
Harrison v. Clark,'0 and Foxworth v. Housing Authority," are probably
unsound precedent in light of Potter.
II. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LEASES 2
Louisiana courts 3 and recent Civil Code revisions 4 strongly reinforce the
principle of freedom of contract. Generally, a contract is the law of the
parties."' On the other hand, a basic principle of Louisiana civil law is that
cancellation of leases is not favored. 6 This latter fundamental principle can
come into direct conflict with lease or Civil Code provisions that would
otherwise permit cancellation-of-right of a lease upon the occurrence of certain
events-for example, non-payment of rent.'7
The doctrine of judicial control of leases is a judicially created equitable
remedy.' 8 Its purpose is to ameliorate the sometimes harsh effects of a
technically proper cancellation. The doctrine evolved from cases where the
lessee made a good-faith error, usually failure to pay rent when due, and acted
reasonably to correct the error when discovered.' 9 The doctrine of judicial
control of lease has been applied to deny cancellation of a lease where: the
lessee withheld part of the rent to pay severance tax in good faith;20 the lessee's
7. Id.
8. Reilly v. Fairway View 1I Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 544 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989),
specifically disapproved in Potter, 615 So. 2d 318.
9. Potter, 615 So. 2d at 325.
10. 607 So. 2d I (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
I1. 590 So. 2d 1347 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), writ not considered, 592 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1993).
12. See generally Armstrong, supra note *, § 11.24.
13. Daigle v. Clemco, Inc., 613 So. 2d 619 (La. 1993).
14. La. Civ. Code arts. 7, 1983.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
16. Tullier v. Tanson Enters., Inc., 359 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), rev'd ot other
grounds, 367 So. 2d 773 (La. 1979).
17. La. Civ. Code art. 2712.
18. Ergon. Inc. v. Allen, 593 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
19. Id. at 440 (cases cited therein). Compare General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Southeastern
Healthcare, Inc., 950 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1992).
20. Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931).
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timely mailed rent was late because of faulty mail delivery; 2' rent was eight
days late and the lease provided no place for payment;22 rent was late due to
failure of bank transmission;23 timely rent was paid by third-party check which
was subsequently not honored;24 and rent was fifteen days late because the
husband assumed his wife had paid rent.2
In a recent affirmation of the continued existence of the doctrine of judicial
control of lease, a divided second circuit panel held that "Louisiana courts are
vested with discretion under certain circumstances to decline to grant a lessor
cancellation of a lease although such right appears to be otherwise available to
him. '26  In Ergon, the lessee failed to pay rent for ten months but paid
promptly, in good faith, upon receipt of a notice to vacate. At the time of the
notice to vacate, the lessor did not demand past due rent or give the lessee an
opportunity to perform. In urging judicial control of lease to avoid cancellation,
the lessee testified that it would incur $7,000,000 in construction costs and other
losses if the lease were cancelled. On these facts, the court applied the doctrine
of judicial control to deny the lessor's right to cancel the lease.27
Surprisingly, the Ergon lessee had been late before in paying its rent. Yet,
inexplicably, it put itself at risk of a potential $7,000,000 loss and disruption of
its business. The questionable equities in Ergon demonstrate why one judge
dissented from application of the jurisprudential doctrine where the Civil Code
is otherwise clear.2 It is difficult to conceive of the "equity" involved under
these circumstances when compared with the earlier cases which involved
substantially less egregious circumstances. The Ergon majority alluded to the
great harm that would occur to third persons if the lease were cancelled as the
reason for application of the doctrine. That valid concern does not, however,
support the application of the equitable doctrine under the circumstances of
Ergon.
Although not discussed, it appears that the subject of Ergon may have been
committed to the Public Service Commission because of Ergon's status as a
pipeline company.29 In that latter instance, a ruling on the lease cancellation
may have been void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
21. Edwards v. Standard Oil Co., 175 La. 720, 144 So. 430 (1932).
22. Baham v. Faust, 333 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
23. Tullier v. Tanson Enters., Inc., 359 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 367 So. 2d 773 (1979).
24. Housing Auth. v. Minor, 355 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So. 2d
1323 (1978).
25. Atkinson v. Richeson, 393 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
26. Ergon, Inc. v. Allen, 593 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
27. Id
28. Id at 441.
29. La. Const. art. IV, § 21(B); Richard D. Moreno, Comment, Louisiana's Constitutional
Agencies: Plenary Powers or "Constitutional Illusions of Being a Fourth Branch of Government,"
51 La. L. Rev. 875 (1991).
30. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1-3, 2002.
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III. VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF LEASE INTERESTS
A. Effect of Judicial Sale on Rights Under Lease3'
In an area of growing interest, Louisiana courts have begun to explore the
nature and effect of how a judicial sale affects rights and obligations in the thing
sold. Under traditional civil law, the sale of a thing necessarily includes the
accessories and accessorial rights of that thing.32 The transfer of accessories
with the sale of the thing, however, is a principle associated with an act of
consensual sale, a conventional obligation.
In St. Jude Medical Office Building Limited Partnership v. City Glass and
Mirror, Inc.,33 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a mortgagee that
purchases, at a judicial sale, immovable property that secures a loan obligation
does not acquire the rights against persons who may have performed defective
workmanship on buildings built on the immovable. Stating the general principle
of Louisiana law that a purchaser can not recover from a third party for property
damage inflicted prior to sale,3" the court rejected an earlier contrary decision
based on a now-repealed Civil Code article.3 5 The court held that under Civil
Code article 1765 "damages due to the owner of a thing for its partial destruction
... belongs to the person who was owner at the time of the .... destruction.
These are personal rights that are not transferred to a [buyer] without a
stipulation to that effect."
3 6
However, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc.,37 a
federal district court held that foreclosure and judicial sale to the mortgagee did
not extinguish the mortgagee's right to enforce terms of leases which were
collaterally assigned as security for the original loan. 3 . Thus, the mortgagee
had the right to enforce those leases. The conclusion reached in Travelers is not
in conflict with the holding in St. Jude because Travelers turned on a specific
lease provision that provided for transfer of rights in the event of a judicial sale.
The lease provided that any purchaser at a judicial sale becomes legal owner and
holder of the lease.39
31. See Armstrong. supra note *, § 2.94.
32. La. Civ. Code arts. 1913, 2461, 2490.
33. 619 So. 2d 529 (La. 1993).
34. Id.
35. Aizpurua v. Crane Pool Co., Inc.. 449 So. 2d 471 (La. 1984); La. Civ. Code an. 2011
(1870).
36. St. Jude, 619 So. 2d at 531.
37. 799 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. La. 1992), affid in part, rev'd in part, 7 F.3d 1203 (5th Cir. 1993).
38. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 12.31.
39. Travelers, 799 F. Supp. 641. The particular lease provision provided that:
(f) any Institutional Mortgagee or third person purchaser at a foreclosure sale may
become the legal owner and holder of this Lease by foreclosure of the Institutional
Mortgage or as a result of the assignment of this lease in lieu of foreclosure, whereupon
such Institutional Mortgagee or third person purchaser shall immediately become and
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In Junior Money Bags, Ltd. v. Segal,4° another case that examines a
different aspect of judicial sale of a lease, held that a purchase of a lease at a
judicial sale imposes no obligations on the purchaser if the lease was effectively
(or could have been) dissolved prior to that purchase. The particular lease
contained a provision that imposed the obligations of the lessee on any successor.
In passing, the Fifth Circuit noted its doubt as to whether the purchaser at a
judicial sale was a "successor." It appears that the subject of the lease, a
gondola structure built over the Mississippi River, had not been used for over
three years prior to the purchase of the lease. As a result, the federal district
court found, and the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
factual determination, that the lessor had acquired the legal right to have the
lease dissolved whenever it wished. Thus, the courts concluded that when the
purchaser of the lease acquired the lessee's interests, he acquired those interests
subject to the lessor's already acquired right to judicial dissolution of the lease.
The purchaser "had thus in actuality not acquired any rights under the lease
because any time [the purchaser] attempted to assert a right, [the lessor] could
have the lease dissolved."'"
B. Amendment to Louisiana Statutory Public Records Doctrine42
Finally, in 1992, the Louisiana Legislature amended the statutory public
records doctrine by adding paragraph B:
Anyone who acquires immovable property in his state, whether by sale,
sheriff's sale, dation en paiement, or in any other manner, which property
is subject to a recorded lease agreement that is not divested by the
acquisition, shall take the property subject to all of the provisions of the
lease, including any provision for the payment of a commission to a
leasing agent or other third party, provided that the lease was recorded
remain liable under this lease except that, as to accrued amounts payable by Lessor to
Lessee under this Lease as of such date, the Lessee shall have no recourse against the
Institutional Mortgagee; and (g) in the event of the termination of this Lease or of any
succeeding lease made pursuant to the provisions of this clause prior to the expiration
date, Lessee will enter into a new lease of the Leased Premises with the Institutional
Mortgagee for the remainder of the term of this Lease, effective as of the date of such
termination, at the rent and additional rent and upon the covenants, agreements, terms,
provisions and limitations herein contained provided such Institutional Mortgagee for the
remainder of the term of this Lease, effective as of the date of such termination, at the
rent and additional rent and upon the covenants, agreements, terms, provisions and
limitations herein contained provided such Institutional Mortgagee makes written request
upon the Lessee for such new lease within thirty (30) days from the date of such
termination.
40. Junior Money Bags, Ltd. v. Segal, 970 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1992); see Armstrong, supra note
*, § 10.35.
41. Junior Money Bags, 970 F.2d at 8.
42. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 6.33.
19941 1241
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
prior to the recordation of the document which establishes the rights of the
person who acquires the property. Such document shall include, but is not
limited to a mortgage, option to purchase, or other writing. 3
IV. INTERPRETATION OF LEASES IN LIGHT OF UNEXPECTED EVENTS"4
In Frey v. Amoco Production Co.,4 the Louisiana Supreme Court grappled
with a question certified by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
concerning whether a mineral lessor was entitled to royalties on a take-or-pay
payment from a third-party gas contract between the lessee and another where the
lease was silent on the question. Although dealing with a mineral lease, the
methodology of analysis is informative for questions arising under ordinary leases.
The Frey court affirmed the basic principle that the lease is the law between
the parties. As such, the lease defines the relative rights and obligations between
the parties. Further, courts are reluctant to rewrite a lease in pursuit of equity.
Nevertheless, the Frey court acknowledged that a lease is not intended to, nor
capable of, anticipating or providing for every eventuality. Where the parties to the
lease have made no provision for a particular situation, it must be assumed that they
intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions of the contract, but
also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a contract of that
kind or necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose. Where a search for the
parties' specific intent relative to any unexpected circumstance is fruitless because
of silence in the lease, a court looks to the parties' general intent in entering into the
particular lease. The lease is then interpreted expansively to fulfill the perceived
general intent of the parties vis-a-vis the unexpected circumstance.
Applying these principles, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that an
underlying fundamental principle of mineral exploration and development leases
is the principle of shared benefits. The take-or-pay payments to the lessees were
a direct result of rights acquired by the lessees under the mineral lease. Thus, in
conformance with the fundamental principle of shared benefits, the mineral lessors
were owed royalties on those payments.
V. THE CONTRACT OF LEASE
A. Vitiation of Consent by Fraud"6
Existence of fraud sufficient to vitiate consent to a lease is a question of
fact.47 The evidentiary standard of proof for fraud is preponderance of the
43. La. R.S. 9:2721(B) (amended by 1992 La. Acts No. 974, § 1).
44. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 2.54.
45. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992), answering question certified by 951 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1992).
46. See Armstrong, supra note *. § 2.62.
47. Borne v. Edwards, 612 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
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evidence.48 Borne v. Edwards is a classic example of a proper finding of fraud
induced by suppression of knowledge. In Borne, the court determined that the
landlord and her attorney fraudulently suppressed information concerning the high
incidence of crime in the neighborhood of the premises. The court found that they
had advertised the premises as "ideal for students" and had told out-of-state lessees
and their parents that "many students resided in the neighborhood." '49 The
landlord urged that the lessees were aware of the "character" of the neighborhood
prior to signing the lease because they drove around the neighborhood. Further-
more, a former tenant told them of a recent burglary on the other side of the
premises.' The court rejected these assertions, holding that subsequent knowl-
edge by the lessee of matters suppressed by the lessor does not defeat a finding of
fraud because fraud arises from the lessor's initial silence. 
l
One author recently suggested that fraud as a remedy in the case of a lease is
not necessary. 2 The argument is that the lessor's obligations to provide peaceable
habitation and premises fit for the intended use are adequate remedies. However,
that proposition overlooks the fact that an action for fraud, if successful, gives
attorney's fees where none may be available in an action brought under the lease
articles.53 Further, an action in fraud may be asserted by persons not party to the
lease.-'
B. Detrimental Reliance in Absence of Lease55
As one court recently observed, the sine qua non to an action for breach of a
lease is the existence of a lease. s6 The burden of proving the existence of any
obligation is on the party urging its existence.57 Where the parties agree that a
lease will be reduced to writing, that agreement is an integral part of the con-
tract. 58 In fact, it is a suspensive condition, the non-occurrence of which prevents
the creation of the contemplated lease contract.5 9 Absent the contemplated written
lease, the parties are bound only to a month-to-month lease6 A party may,
48. La. Civ. Code art. 1957; Borne, 612 So. 2d 219.
49. Borne, 612 So. 2d at 221.
50. Id.
51. 141
52. See Marie I. Moore, Selected Issues in Louisiana Real Estate Leasing (National Business
Institute, Inc. 1993).
53. La. Civ. Code art. 1958.
54. Id
55. See generally Armstrong, supra note , § 11.2.
56. Martin v. Schluntz, 589 So. 2d 1208 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
57. La. Civ. Code art. 1831.
58. Martin, 589 So. 2d at 1210.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 1767.
60. Martin, 589 So. 2d at 1210.
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however, obtain relief on the basis of detrimental reliance in the absence of a lease
because of a failure to reduce the lease to writing.6'
C. Cancellation of Lease-Adequacy of Grounds
Where the lease required written notice to lessor "of the need for repairs not
of an emergency nature," failure to correct poor drainage or to provide twelve
exclusive parking slots was not sufficient grounds for the lessee to cancel the lease
where the lessor had not been given written notice.62
D. Option to Renew-Burden of Proof63
Where the term of the lease has expired by its own terms, the lessee bears the
burden of proof that it exercised any existing option to renew. 6  Whether the
lessee exercised an existing option to renew is a question of fact reviewed under the
"clearly wrong" or "manifestly erroneous" standard.65
VI. PARTICULAR LEASE PROVISIONS
A. Ambiguity of Tern 66
Where a lease stated that "the term.., shall be ten (10) years, commencing on
the 1st day of May, 1987 (Commencement Date), and ending on the 30th day of
April, 1992," the court held that use of specific dates, particularly an ending date,
established afive-year term, despite the expression of a ten-year term.67
B. Release and Indemnity Provisions in Leases
68
In Home Insurance Co. v. National Tea Co.,69 the Louisiana Supreme Court
was required to interpret a provision which provided:
The Lessor hereby covenants and agrees to carry replacement insurance
in limits sufficient to rebuild total development including demised
premises and does hereby release and discharge the Lessee, its agents,
61. Id. at 1211; La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
62. Myers v. Foster, 610 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
63. See generally Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 11.21, 11.45.
64. New Hotel Monteleone, Inc. v. Depp's Bull Corner, Inc., 598 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992).
65. Id. at 724.
66. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 5.2, 5.6.
67. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 641, 655 (E.D. La. 1992), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 7 F.3d 1203 (5th Cir. 1993).
68. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 2.53.
69. 588 So. 2d 361 (La. 1991).
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successors and assigns from any and all claims and damages whatsoever
from any cause resulting from or arising out of any fire or other casualty
on the herein demised premises or on said total development or any part
thereof....
At expiration of said terms, Lessee will quit and surrender the
premises hereby demised in as good state and condition as received,
reasonable wear and tear incident to Lessee's business and damage by fire
or the elements, or from other causes beyond its control excepted. °
The court of appeal rejected the argument that the release provision was an
indemnity agreement. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that Louisiana
courts have characterized such contractual exculpatory agreements as "comparable
to an agreement to indemnify one against one's own negligence." To be effective,
such release-indemnity provisions must be "expressed in unequivocal terms.""
In another case, a lease provision provided:
Lessor and Lessee shall each indemnify, defend, and hold the other
harmless from claims, demands, and causes of action asserted against the
other by any third party (including, without limitation, Lessor's and
Lessee's employees) for personal injury or death or for loss of or damage
to property and resulting from the negligence or willful misconduct of the
indemnifying party. When personal injury, death, or loss of or damage to
property is the result of the joint negligence or willful misconduct of
Lessor and Lessee, each party's duty of indemnification shall be in
proportion to its allocable share of joint negligence or willful miscon-
duct.72
This provision was held to provide no indemnity to lessee by lessor where lessee
was completely at fault for having caused a defect to lessor's property whereon
lessor's employee was injured."
C. Attorney's Fees7 4
Careful drafting of an attorney's fees clause in a lease should include treatment
of rental income that may be gained by reletting the premises after a breach of the
lease. In a recent case, a lease provision provided for contractual attorney's fees
of "15 percent of the total rent due." The court held that the clause supported an
70. Id. at 363.
71. Id. at 364.
72. Morales v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 608 So. 2d 282, 286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ
denied, 610 So. 2d 818 (1993) (emphasis supplied).
73. Id.
74. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 4.43.
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award of attorney's fees in the amount of fifteen percent of accelerated rent under
the lease less any rentals earned by reletting the premises.75
VII. DEFENSES TO SUIT ON LEASE OBLIGATIONS
A. Mitigation of Damages-Lessor's Duty to Possess to Relet76
The lessor's option to possess to relet the premises in case of lessee's
unjustifiable abandonment is a narrow exception to the general rule that the lessor
may not take or disturb the possession of the lessee during the term of the lease
without resort to judicial process." It is a form of mitigation of damages.78
Exercise of the lessor's right to relet the premises is measured by the objective
standard of reasonableness under the circumstances.79 However, the lessor may
properly refuse to exercise the right to relet the premises where a guarantor of the
lease objects to the rental terms of the relet. 0 Such refusal, if justifiable and
reasonable, is an excuse to the lessee's affirmative defense of failure to mitigate
damages.
In a related development, in 1993 the Louisiana Legislature enacted Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:3260, which provides:
When a lessee or tenant of commercial, residential, or dwelling
premises has been constructively evicted from the premises, and when the
premises are rendered uninhabitable through no fault of the lessee or
tenant, the landlord shall be required to mitigate his damages.8
Section 3260 became effective on August 15, 1993.82
It is not clear what, if anything, Section 3260 adds that does not already exist
under the Civil Code. A lease is a bilateral contract, 3 in which both the lessor and
75. First Downtown Dev. v. Cimochowski, 613 So. 2d 671, 679 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
615 So. 2d 340 (1993). The particular lease provision provided:
Should an attorney be employed by either Landlord or Tenant to give special attention
to the enforcement or protection of any claim of Landlord or Tenant arising from this
Lease, the other party hereto, if such claimant is successful, shall pay as fees and
compensation to such attorney, an additional sum of fifteen (15%) percent of the amount
of such claim, the minimum fee, however, to be $500,000, or if the claim be not for
money, then such sum as will constitute a reasonable fee together with all costs, charges
and expenses if such claim is successfully asserted.
76. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 5.82-5.83.
77. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Melville Realty Co., 591 So. 2d 1376 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1991).
78. id. at 1378.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1379.
81. La. R.S. 9:3260 (Supp. 1994), added by 1993 La. Acts No. 906, § 1.
82. La. Const. art. III, § 19.
83. La. Civ. Code arts. 2669, 1908.
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lessee are obligees. The Civil Code requires that an obligee "must make reasonable
efforts to mitigate the damage."4 Section 3260 appears to add a superfluous
complement to Civil Code article 2699. Article 2699 gives the lessee the right to
annul the lease if the premises "cease[] to be fit for the purpose for which it was
leased" without any fault of the lessor. Under Section 3260, if the premises "are
rendered uninhabitable" without any fault of the lessee or lessor, an obligation to
mitigate damages arises. Further, the reference in Section 3260 is redundant
because Civil Code article 2699 also protects the lessee against circumstances in
which the use of the leased premises "be much impeded."
B. Lack of Privity in Lessor/Sublessee Suits
Generally, the lessor has no right to collect rent from a sublessee. The right to
collect rent is derived from the primary lease to which the sublessee is not a party;
also, the lessor is not a party to the sublease." The lack of privity may be raised
as a defense in a suit for past due rent by the lessor against the sublessee. 7
C. Lessee's Fault"
Knowledge by the lessee of a defect left unrepaired by the lessor may result in
fault being assessed to the lessee where injuries occur to a third person because of
that defect."9 A tenant's failure to exercise his right to repair and deduct may
provide a basis for reduction of the lessor's fault under comparative fault
principles. 90 Further, there is no doubt that a third person may recover damages
for injuries caused to him by activities of the tenant on land adjoining the leased
premises.
91
D. Third Party Fault
Several recent cases have found full or partial fault in third persons or the
lessee. In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,92
the court found that the fault of a third party utility company caused a fire that
84. La. Civ. Code art. 2002.
85. See Armstrong, supra note , §§ 4.4-4.42, 5.6, 11.22.
86. Sauer v. Toye, 616 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993); State Dep't of Transp. and Dev.
v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank, 594 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 608
(1992).
87. Sauer, 616 So. 2d at 211; Hebert v. Hines, 615 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
88. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 7.21, 7.3, 7.42.
89. Marcantel v. Karam, 601 So. 2d I (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); Roberts v. Orpheum Corp., 610
So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 682 (1993).
90. Marcantel, 601 So. 2d 1.
91. Morales v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 608 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied,
610 So. 2d 818 (1993); see Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 6.42, 7.5.
92. 590 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
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damaged the leased premises. In Astredo v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,93 the
,court held that the lessee and the third party power company were totally at fault
in an accident involving the lessee's injury by electrocution while trimming tree
limbs adjacent to a power line.
E. Act of God 94
In Hughes v. Green,95 the entire sheetrock ceiling fell on the tenant sleeping
in her bed. The tenant put on no proof of a vice in construction or neglect to repair.
The court held that collapse of the ceiling did not imply a defect.9' Furthermore,
the court held that the failure to prove a defect precluded a finding of liability on
a theory of negligence.'
F. Failure to Give Notice of Breach9"
An affirmative defense of lessor's breach of lease obligations will fail if the
lease requires written notice to the lessor and such notice is not given.99 Other
matters that must be pled as affirmative defenses include failure to mitigate
damages and lack of fitness for use.' °°
G. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221101
A novel claim by an injured employee of a lessee-employer was rejected by the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit.'0 2 The lease contained a provision that shifted the
lessor's liability to the lessee under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221. The
employee urged that the lease thus created a contractual basis of liability for the
injury to the employee. Further, the employee urged that this contractual liability
was outside of the employer-lessee's worker's compensation immunity. The
employee argued that the lease created a "dual doctrine" basis for liability. The
court rejected the argument on the basis that the employer's obligations to provide
a safe work place are the same under worker's compensation law or as a lessee who
has assumed responsibility under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221.03
93. 612 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992).
94. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 8.21, 8.71.
95. 609 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 612 So. 2d 82 (1993); La. Civ. Code
arts. 2317, 2322.
96. Hughes, 609 So. 2d at 993.
97. Id.
98. See generally Armstrong, supra note *, § 11.23.
99. Myers v. Foster, 610 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
100. Id.; La. Civ. Code art. 2002.
101. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 7.22, 8.52.
102. Roberts v. Orpheum Corp., 610 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So.
2d 682 (1993).
103. Id. at 1101.
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Alternatively, the employee argued that the shifting of liability to his employer-
lessee through Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 violated his due process right to
sue.'°4 The court rejected this argument because the lease pre-dated the vesting of
the employee's cause of action. Nevertheless, summary judgment in favor of the
lessor was reversed because it failed to present any evidence of its knowledge of
the defect.'0 5
H. Interrelationship of the Law of Accessions to Law of Lease'06
In a recent case, the first circuit narrowly avoided having to reconcile recent
revisions in property law and their possible effects on a terminated agricultural
lease. In Caballero Planting Co. v. Hymel,'°7 the lessor terminated an oral, year-
to-year agricultural lease. The lessee's sugar cane crop apparently was not ready
for harvest. The lessee vacated the land as demanded by the lessor. Approximately
four months later the lessor sent a letter to the lessee which advised that the lessee
could remove any plantings located on the lessor's property. The lessee declined
to remove the plantings and subsequently sued the lessor for the value of the plant
cane and stubble left on the property.
The lessor urged that under Louisiana Civil Code article 493, as revised in
1976, if the lessee does not remove his plantings within ninety days after written
demand, the owner of the land acquires ownership and owes nothing to the
former owner. The first circuit opined in dicta that "we have doubts as to
whether the legislature intended Article 493 to apply to a crop such as sugar
cane, planted by a lessee with the lessors' full knowledge and consent, which has
a growing season greatly in excess of ninety days."'08 However, by concluding
that the lessors' letter was not sufficient to meet the demand requirements of
Article 493, the court was not required to decide if Article 493 applied under
these circumstances. '9 The result in Caballero Planting is correct even if Article
493 had been applied because Article 7 of the Civil Code forbids application of
a law where the results are absurd. Surely, the results would be absurd where
it is physically impossible for the planting to be removed prior to their readiness
for harvest.
The Caballero Planting problem exists wherever there is an agricultural
lease whose term is shorter than the time required to grow a crop. Examples
include: sugar cane, Christmas trees, and pulp wood trees. One possible
solution is to presume that the agreed term of an agricultural lease is the time
required for the agreed crop to be grown and harvested. Such a presumption
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1102.
106. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 9.21.
107. 597 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
108. Id. at 37.
109. Id. at 38.
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could be based in the general Civil Code provisions governing consent, object,
and error. The preferred solution is a statutory closing of this gap.
VIII. EVICTION-RELATED MATrERS" t0
A. Nature of Eviction Proceedings
Eviction is a summary proceeding that is in rem in nature. The sole issue
in an eviction proceeding is whether the lessee's right to possess the thing leased
was terminated. No personal judgment may be sought or obtained against the
lessee in an eviction proceeding."' The lessor attempting to evict a sublessee
has the burden of proving the dissolution or termination of the primary lease." 2
Whether the primary lease has been dissolved or terminated is a question of
fact." 3 Further, as a result of recent legislative action, the application for, or
the receipt of, entitlements or funds, under any federal or state rent subsidy
program or rent subsidy assistance shall not be considered payment of rent and
shall not be a defense to an action to evict the lessee." 4 Finally, the fact that
a violation or breach of a lease may have abated by the time the notice to vacate
is delivered or served is irrelevant and does not cure the violation or breach." 5
B. Renotification Rule-Lease of Movables'"6
It is well settled that after accepting some or all of the past due rent, the
lessor of an immovable must give a new notice to vacate prior to instituting an
eviction proceeding."' This "renotification rule" has a long history of
consistent application to immovables."e However, whether the renotification
rule is applicable to the lease of movables has only been recently addressed.
After an extensive analysis of legal sources, the United States Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided that the renotification rule is inapplicable to a lease of
movables." 9
110. See generally Armstrong, supra note *, Ch. 11 and § 11.43.
111. Fairfield Property Management Stone Vista Apartments v. Evans, 589 So. 2d 83 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1991).
112. Sauer v. Toye, 616 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at 211,
114. La. Civ. Code art. 2712(B), added by 1992 La. Acts No. 1108, § 1; see Armstrong, supra
note *, §§ 11.22, 11.46.
115. Catahoula Apartments Partnership v. Jones, 590 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); see
Armstrong, supra note *, § 11.23.
116. See generally Armstrong, supra note *, § 11.22.
117. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Southeastern Health Care, Inc., 950 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1991).
118. Id. at 949.
119. Id. at 954.
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IX. NOTICE-RELATED ISSUES' 20
A. Waiver of Notice Requirements
Where the lease waives the requirement of notice of default, technical
defects in the notice are inadequate defenses as a matter of law to an action for
eviction actually given.' Further, any pro forma reference in verified
statements in an eviction petition, or affidavits in support thereof, which refer "to
notice having been given pursuant to the terms of the lease implying that the
lease required such notice are deemed meaningless surplusage."'22  Such
surplusage can not alter the meaning of an otherwise clear and unambiguous
lease. 12
3
B. Notice to Vacate-Date
One court has suggested that a prudent notice to vacate will expressly state
the date that the lessor will resume possession. 24  The giving of such an
express date operates to avoid confusion as to when the lessee's right to possess
terminates.
C Notice to Vacate-Grounds
A notice to vacate which gives as sole grounds, "the owner wants
possession," is adequate to terminate a month-to-month lease if timely delivered
to the lessee. 22  Further, such notice may be given at any time during the
current month prior to ten days before the end of that month. 2 6 It is unclear
whether a lessor may give a notice to vacate which is effective at a time later
than the end of the current period in which the notice is given. Arguably, such
notice, if acquiesced in by the lessee, might convert a period-to-period,
reconducted lease into a lease for a specific term. Regardless, absent evidence
of acquiescence,' the lessee retains the right to give the lessor a notice of
termination which is effective earlier than that date given in the lessor's notice.
In a recent case, the lease provided that all termination notices must specify
"the grounds of termination with enough detail for the [t]enant to prepare a
120. See generally Armstrong, supra note *, § 11.42.
121. Poydras Square Ass'n v. Suzette's Artique, 614 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
122. Id. at 133.
123. Id. at 134.
124. Management One, Inc. v. Thibodeaux, 598 So. 2d 1224 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
125. Id. at 1225.
126. Id.
127. La. Civ. Code art. 1942 (silence as acceptance).
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defense."' 2' The court held that a notice that cited failure to abide by the rules
in the lease, unauthorized guests staying in the apartment, and excessive noises
coming from the apartment as reasons for eviction, failed "to specify the grounds
for termination with enough detail to permit the [tienant to prepare a de-
fense."' 29 One can only conclude that the absence of detail concerning time
and place of the infractions caused the court to find the mandated notice
insufficient to permit the tenant "to prepare a defense."'3 °
X. SERVICE OF PROCESS BY TACKING-ADEQUACY'
The question of whether service of process by tacking as permitted by
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4703 is adequate to defeat a
declinatory exception of insufficiency of service'32 is a question of fact.'
Tacking is authorized by Article 4703 where the tenant's whereabouts are
unknown. Within the meaning of Article 4703, a tenant's whereabouts are
unknown when the person attempting service knocks several times on the door
of the leasehold and looks for signs of someone present.'3" Article 4703 does
not mandate that the person trying to effect service conduct an exhaustive search
or make multiple attempts to locate the lessee at home.'35
The Fairfield court emphasized that this is especially true "where the service
by tacking was effective"; in other words, where service of process was in fact
received by the lessee.'36 Testimony by the tenant that he received a notice
that was served by tacking creates a presumption that the lessee was not home
when the notice was tacked or was inside the premises but refused to make his
presence known. Either instance meets the prerequisites for tacking under
Article 4703.'
The Fairfield court declined to decide whether service by certified or
registered mail would be preferable. The court simply noted that Article 4703
does not provide for service by those means. 38 Finally, because the lessee did
not challenge the constitutionality of Article 4703, the court pretermitted review
128. Apollo Plaza Apartments v. Gosey, 599 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
129. Id. a 494-95.
130. Id.
131. See generally Armstrong, supra note , § 11.42.
132. La. Code Civ. P. art. 925(2).
133. Fairfield Property Management Stone Vista Apartments v. Evans, 589 So. 2d 83, 85 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1991).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 85.
136. d




in light of Green v. Lindsey.'39 The court did note that Article 4703 had been
found to be constitutional by Ernest Joubert Co. v. Tatum.
140
XI. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A lessee may intervene in a suit by the lessor to evict a sublessee. 4' An
intervention is an incidental action that employs the same procedure as the main
demand. 42 Thus, failure to file an answer in the summary eviction proceed-
ings does not preclude intervention.'43
XII. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED HOUSING LEASES
44
Some federally subsidized housing programs mandate that the lease contain
provisions that require a grievance procedure as an adjunct to state law provi-
sions. 45 In some instances, those procedures may include appeal rights from an
adverse decision. 4 6 However, in some instances, the regulations have been
amended to specifically exclude eviction proceedings from the grievance/appeal
procedure. An example of that is found in Catahoula Apartments Partnership
v. Jones.'47 In Catahoula, the court acknowledged the regulatory mandated
grievance/appeal procedure but cited the exclusion of eviction proceedings
therefrom. 48 Under that exclusion, "termination of tenancy and eviction [are]
handled by a judicial process under State or local law."' 149 Finding that the
legislative intent of such exclusions is to reduce the burden of a duplication of
effort in the termination of tenancy and eviction, the Catahoula court refused to
enjoin the eviction proceedings so as to permit an administrative proceeding
under the lease and regulations incorporated therein. 50  As noted above, in
1992 the Louisiana Legislature added paragraph B to Louisiana Civil Code
article 2712 to provide that the application for, or the receipt of, entitlements or
funds, under any federal or state rent subsidy program or rent subsidy assistance
shall not be considered payment of rent and shall not be a defense to an action
to evict the lessee.'
15
139. 456 U.S. 444, 102 S. Ct. 1874 (1982).
140. 332 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); compare Friedman v. Hofchar, Inc., 424 So. 2d
496 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) and McLellan v. Pearson, 546 So. 2d 817 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
141. Sauer v. Toye, 616 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 210.
143. Id.
144. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 11.46.
145. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1944.551-.600 (1993).
146. Id.
147. 590 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 628 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 56,176 (1983)).
149. Id.
150. Catahoula Apartments Partnership v. Jones, 590 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
151. La. Civ. Code art. 2712(B), added by 1992 La. Acts No. 1108, § 1.
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XIII. SEQUESTRATION 5 2
Historically, sequestration has been viewed as a harsh remedy. Thus,
Louisiana courts require that its statutory provisions be strictly construed against
the party seeking sequestration. 153 As a result, there has been some uncertainty
concerning when the right of sequestration-provided in Louisiana Civil Code
article 2709 as a right which may be exercised "within 15 days after [the object
sought to be sequestered has] been removed by the lessee"-terminates.'54
The Burton v. Jardell court held that the restrictive nature of the writ of
sequestration required that the fifteen-day period commence when the lessee
abandons the premises. Further, the court held that a sequestration imposed
within fifteen days of when the lessor learned of the abandonment, but which
occurred more than fifteen days after actual abandonment, was untimely and
supported an award of damages for wrongful seizure
5
Because wrongful sequestration is raised by reconventional demand, the
lessee bears the burden of proof of showing on what date he vacated the
premises. 6 That burden may be met by his testimony with corroboration.'"
Damages for wrongful seizure include actual damages sustained, loss of profit,
and loss of use for a movable wrongfully seized.' 58 Proof of damages must be
clear, definite, and not subject to conjecture.'59 Fair market value is not a
measure of actual damages. Also, the lessee must prove actual loss. However,
if the lessee fails to prove actual loss with certainty, the court should fix
damages as best it can from the record.' 6 Attorney's fees awarded for a claim
of wrongful seizure raised as a reconventional demand are limited to the fees
associated with the reconventional demand. 
161
Citing Article 5059 of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the Burton court
suggested in dicta that if the fifteenth day falls on a legal holiday, the lessor has
an additional day to seize the object to be sequestered. 62 Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 323 permits the sheriff to serve a writ of sequestration on
legal holidays. What the Burton court probably intended to state was that the
152. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 12.22-12.23, 12.2333.
153. Burton v. Jardell, 589 So. 2d 610, 613 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
154. La. Civ. Code art. 2709.
155. Burton, 589 So. 2d at 613 (rejecting contrary rule of Pesson v. Kleckley, 526 So. 2d 1220
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), noting that Pesson relied on Edmons v. Totem Stores, 229 La. 467, 86 So.
2d 104 (1956), which was decided in reliance on the 1870 Code of Practice article 288 which was
replaced by Article 2709 of the Civil Code).
156. Id. at 613-14.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 614.
159. Id.; Holliman v. Griffis, 415 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 456
(1982).
160. Burton, 589 So. 2d at 614; La. Civ. Code art. 1999.
161. Burton, 589 So. 2d at 615.
162. Id. at 614 n.3.
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lessor had until the next day which was not a legal holiday to file a rule seeking
issuance of a writ of sequestration if the fifteenth day fell on a legal holiday. 63
XIV. OTHER SEIZURE-RELATED ISSUES
A. Exemptions-Tool of Trade or Profession
The test of whether an object qualifies as a tool or instrument of the trade
or profession is whether or not the tool or instrument is necessary for the
exercise of the trade or profession; that is, whether or not the debtor will be
prevented from exercising his trade or profession if he is deprived of the tool or
instrument. Because the latter question turns upon the former, the debtor cannot
be deprived of the tools or instruments if the profession or trade cannot be
practiced without them without severe hardship. Whether an object constitutes
a "tool or instrument of the trade" is a factual determination with the outcome
dependent on the particular facts of each case.' 64 Further, no presumption
arises against the owner because he does not immediately seek to recover the
seized "tools of the trade."'163
B. Seizure of Lessee's Property by Lessor's Judgment Creditor'6
A lessor's judgment creditor may execute upon the lessor's property in the
hands of the lessee. However, the creditor may not seize and sell the lessee's
property. One court recently held that property in possession of the lessee is
presumed to be owned by the lessee.167  The burden is upon the seizing
creditor, at risk for a claim of wrongful seizure, to prove otherwise.'6 "
C. Physical Reach of Lessor's Privilege-lInplications For Wrongful Seizure
It is not uncommon for a lessor to file a suit for back rent and, in that suit,
to cause a writ of sequestration to issue on the basis of a lessor's lien.' 9
Further, it is not unusual for a lessor to cause the seizure of the lessee's personal
automobile, found in the apartment common-area parking lot, typically some
distance from the leased apartment, under that writ.
163. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5059.
164. Huber Oil Co. v. Giovingo, 611 So. 2d 137, 138 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 610
So. 2d 801 (1993); see Armstrong, supra note *, § 12.231.
165. Huber Oil, 611 So. 2d at 139.
166. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 12.32, 12.51.
167. Boxx v. Bart's On The Lake, Ltd., 611 So. 2d 748, 750 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
168. Id.
169. See La. Civ. Code art. 2705.
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Article 2705 gives the lessor "a right of pledge on the movable effects of the
lessee, which are found on the property leased."' 70  The phrase, "property
leased," is the measure of the reach of the lessor's lien on the lessee's movables
under Article 2705. However, the very narrow definition of Article 2703's
phrase "leased premises" given by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Potter,
17 1
poses the possibility that the meaning and scope of Article 2705's phrase
"property leased" should also be reexamined. Viewed in light of the narrow
definition of "leased premises" in Potter, an aggressive interpretation of Article
2705's phrase "property leased" may raise the possibility of wrongful .seizure.
It is well established that all privileges, including the lessor's lien, are
construed stricti juris. Article 2705 grants a lessor the right to sequester all
movables located on the "property leased."'' 2 Construing the lessor's lien stricti
juris, the Louisiana first circuit has held that a vehicle is wrongfully seized under
a writ of sequestration issued on the basis of a lessor's lien where the property
leased does not include the particular parking area on which the vehicle is
parked. 73 On the other hand, the same court sustained such a seizure where
the property leased is the place of the lessee's business.'
The typical residential apartment lease will unambiguously define the leased
premises leased as "Apartment - of the Apartments."
It is unusual for a residential apartment lease to allocate specific parking places
over which the tenant has exclusive rights of occupancy. Therein lies the Potter
problem. As Potter implies, where the vehicle is merely parked in a common-
area parking lot adjacent or near the leased premises, and the vehicle is unrelated
to any business conducted on or from the leased property, it may not be seized
under the lessor's lien. 75 That result obtains because a common parking lot
is not under exclusive control of the lessee. Potter holds that the common area,
such as a parking lot, does not form a part of the leased premises under Article
2703. One must logically infer that the same common-area parking lot does not
form a part of the "property leased" under Article 2705.
Thus, Potter reinforces and validates the rationale of Boutte and Moseley-a
common parking lot is not the "property leased" within the meaning of Article
2705. Thus, seizure of a lessee's personal vehicle from a common parking area
under a writ of sequestration issued on authority of a lessor's privilege under
Article 2705 will be a wrongful seizure.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Potter v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 615 So. 2d 318 (La. 1993); see supra discussion
at text accompanying notes 1-8.
172. La. Civ. Code art. 2705.
173. Boutte v. Scott, 43 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
174. Moseley v. Doran, 163 So. 198 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935).
175. Boutte, 43 So. 2d 79; Moseley, 163 So. 2d 198.
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XV. LEASE DEPOSITS7 6
A. Effect of Annulment of Lease on Obligation to Return Deposit'
If the lease is annulled because of a vice of consent,178 such as error,179
fraud,' ° or duress,' 8' the deposit must be returned without reference to
Louisiana Lessee Deposit Law. 2 This results from that fact that when a
contract is annulled, all performances previously given are returned.'8 3
B. Contractual Variation of Louisiana Lease Deposit Law'"
A lease may impose conditions, including termination notice requirements,
which, if violated, permit the lessor to retain some or all of the deposit as
damages for that breach. 85 Such a notice provision is not contra bonos
mores18s or violative of public policy as expressed in Louisiana Lessee Deposit
Law.
87
XVI. DEVELOPING AREAS OF POTENTIAL LESSOR LIABILITY
A. State Law
1. Tortious Interference with Lease's8
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently recognized a narrowly-drawn
cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations.'8 9 The court
held that such a cause of action would lie where a corporate officer committed
an intentional and unjustified interference with contractual relations between his
employer and a third person.'ag°
176. See generally Armstrong, supra note 0, Ch. 16.
177. See id § 13.2.
178. La. Civ. Code art. 1948.
179. La. Civ. Code arts. 1949-1952.
180. La. Civ. Code arts. 1953-1958.
181. La. Civ. Code arts. 1959-1964.
182. La. R.S. 9:3251 (1991); Mays v. Alley, 599 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ not
considered, 604 So. 2d 992 (1992).
183. La. Civ. Code art. 2033.
184. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 16.1, 16.3.
185. Mays, 599 So. 2d 459.
186. La. Civ. Code arts. 7. 2046.
187. La. R.S. 9:3251 et seq. (1991).
188. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 2.10.




In a later case, First Downtown Development v. Cimochowski,'9' the lessor
claimed that the sole shareholder of the corporate lessee had intentionally and
unjustifiably caused a breach of a three-year lease by not informing the lessor
that the shareholder was seeking immediate out-of-state employment. Rejecting
the claim, the second circuit held that a duty to refrain from an intentional and
unjustifiable interference is not the equivalent of a duty to disclose employment
plans to the lessor.192 Thus, the lessor failed to state a cause of action against
the sole shareholder lessee under 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney.
In Junior Money Bags, Ltd. v. Segal,9 ' a lessor of land and air space, to
be used for the erection of a tower support and landing station for a gondola,
sued a purchaser of a lease at a judicial sale, seeking a declaration that the
purchaser's right of occupancy under the lease had terminated. The purchaser
counterclaimed for tortious interference with business relations and opportunities
under section 766B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' 9 The United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing its diversity jurisdiction and reluctance to
expand the narrow Louisiana 9 to 5 cause of action, concluded that although 9
to 5 had recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with business,
"[tihis tort does not appear to be as broad as it is under the Restatement or as
[purchaser] urges.'9'
2. Lead Paint' 96
With respect to the specific defect of the presence of lead paint on the
premises, the lessor now has specific obligations imposed by state 97 and federal
law.' 98 Breach of a duty imposed by these statutes may give rise to a claim
for injuries to the lessee or a third person' 99 under Louisiana Civil Code article
2317.
3. Slip-And-Fall Statute Not Applicable to Lessor20
In a slip-and-fall case, the court refused to extend Louisiana's codified slip-
and-fall law20 1 to impose a duty on a landowner-lessor who was not a mer-
191. 613 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
192. Id. at 675.
193. 970 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1992).
194. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1981).
195. Junior Money Bags, 970 F.2d at 10.
196. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 8.21, 8.51.
197. La. R.S. 40:1299.20-1299.25 (repealed 1989).
198. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3910-3911 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4852d (1993)).
199. Tillman v. Johnson, 610 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), rev'd, 612 So. 2d 70 (1993)
(remanded on Article 2317 claim of lead paint as defect).
200. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 8.5.
201. La. R.S. 9:2800.6.
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chant. 2 The court, however, found that the landowner-lessor owed a duty to
third persons because of a lease provision in which the landowner assumed a
duty to keep the parking lot free of snow and ice. That duty supported a finding
of liability under the Civil Code negligence articles.0" It is important to note
that the court found a duty owed to third persons by looking to the lessor-lessee
agreement. 2"
4. Obligations of Neighborhood0 5
A recent case examined the implications of an owner-lessor owning a
defective building which was adjacent to the leased property in question.2°0 A
purported defect in the owner's property caused a fire that damaged the leased
property. The lessee sought damages from the owner-lessor on theories of
breach of the obligation of neighborhood2 7 and damage caused by a vice or
defect in the premises. 208 The court held that the plaintiffs who were lessees
and sublessees of the owner were not neighbors within the meaning of Louisiana
Civil Code article 667; thus, it provided no grounds for relief. As for Louisiana
Civil Code article 2695, the court stated in dicta that failure to maintain a
sprinkler system during renovation did not violate a city code or industry
standards; thus, there was no defect. The statement was dicta because the court
held that absence of a sprinkler system was not a defect under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2695. The concurrence by two judges emphasized that an Article
2695 defect must be in the premises leased,.but not in an adjacent property, even
if both are owned by the lessor.
B. Federal Law
1. Americans With Disabilities Act"°
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) 210 may impose affirmative
obligations on the lessor to make reasonable accommodations to meet some
exceptional needs where a public accommodation is being leased.2"
202. Katsanis v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 615 So. 2d 1114 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 617
So. 2d 942 (1993).
203. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315. 2316.
204. Katsanis, 615 So. 2d at 1119.
205. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 7.22.
206. Westridge v. Poydras Properties, 598 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (two judges concurring
in result only), writ denied, 605 So. 2d 1092, 1093, 1099 (1992).
207. La. Civ. Code art. 667.
208. La. Civ. Code art. 2695.
209. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 7.22.
210. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
211. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 12183 (1993).
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2. Sherman Act Violations Caused by Tying of Commercial Lease to
Services'
The Sherman Act may be violated by a lease that requires an agricultural
lessee to market its agricultural product to a particular processor at a
particular location. 213 Such an arrangement may violate the anti-tying
provisions of the Sherman Act. If so, the lease is illegal because it
unreasonably restrains competition." 4 Such a finding may give rise to
cancellation of the lease as a contract with an illegal cause or object." 5
XVII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. Irreparable Injury Caused by Potential Environmental Damages"6
Where the lessee's use of the leased land causes or threatens to cause
environmental damage, a lessor may obtain an injunction against further harmful
activities if he can demonstrate irreparable harm. 7 Irreparable harm may be
proved by expert testimony that the site has become polluted, clean-up costs are
substantial, and lessee is selling its assets with plans to go out of business.2 '8
B. Expropriation Compensation Rights of Sublessee219
The sublessee who exercises his rights through the original lease has a right
to compensation for improvements placed on the property by the sublessee.22 °
C. Recordation
In a recent case, an appellate court held that a recorded lease that contains
a provision permitting the lessee to sublet, does not place third persons on notice
of the possibility of a sublease, 22 ' and to state that the sublessee is protected
thereby "goes beyond the bounds of the public records doctrine embodied in
R.S. 9:2721." '22
212. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 3.54, 9.3.
213. Breaux Bros. Farms, Inc. v. Teche Sugar Co., 792 F. Supp. 1436 (W.D. La. 1992).
214. Id.
215. La. Civ. Code arts. 1966, 1971; see Armstrong, supra note *, § 4.6.
216. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 3.42.
217. AZBY Fund v. Strike-N-Arc, Inc., 612 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992), writ denied,
618 So. 2d 408 (1993).
218. Id.
219. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 15.22.
220. State Dep't of Transp. and Dev. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank, 594 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 608 (1992).
221. Sauer v. Toye, 616 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
222. Id.; La. R.S. 9:2721(B) (Supp. 1994), added by 1992 La. Acts No. 974, § 1; see Armstrong.
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D. Mineral Leases as Modification of Traditional Ownership Rights22
Acknowledging that the principles of Louisiana mineral law modify
traditional notions of private property ownership, Louisiana courts have held that
a mineral lessee may use the property of adjoining land owners under permit
from the Commissioner of Conservation if that adjacent property is part of the
properly permitted compulsory exploration unit.2"
XVIII. BANKRUPTCY-RELATED ISSUES225
A. Pre-Petition Incurred/Post-Petition Matured Claims2 26
Claims that are incurred pre-petition, but mature post-petition, are treated as
.pre-petition claims. 22
B. Assignment of Lease as Subjective Novation228
An acceptance and assignment of a lease constitutes a substitution of the
assignee as the debtor in place of the estate.229 Once the lease is accepted and
assigned, state law governs the rights of the parties.230 If the acceptance and
assignment constitutes a novation, and a novation discharges guarantors of the
original lease under controlling state law, guarantors are so discharged after
acceptance and assignment.23' However, the debtor must prove by convincing
evidence that the creditor intended a novation.232 However, an assigned lease
conveys greater rights than a sublease.2 aa In particular, the assignee of a lease
may exercise an option to lease in the original lease, while a sublessee may
not. 234
supra note *, §§ 2.91-2.92.
223. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 3.41.
224. Nunez v. Wainco Oil and Gas Co., 606 So. 2d 1320 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied,
608 So. 2d 1010 (1993); La. R.S. 30:9(C), 30:204(A), 30:204(F), 30:217 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
225. See generally Armstrong, supra note *, Ch. 13.
226. See id. § 13.6.
227. In re Ames Dep't Store, Inc., 150 B.R. 107 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
228. See Armstrong, supra note *, §§ 12.41, 13.5.
229. Wainer v. A.J. Equities, Ltd., 984 F.2d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 1993); 11 U.S.C. § 365(K)
(1993).
230. Wainer, 984 F.2d at 683.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 684.




C. Effect of Rejection of Lease On Lessor-Lessee-Sublessee Relationship235
Following rejection of a lease by the tenant-debtor, who has subleased the
premises, the tenant-debtor has neither statutory, contractual, nor possessory
rights in the leased premises.2" Therefore, the landlord must proceed against
the sublessee to regain possession.237
XIX. THE LEASE AND PREDIAL SERVITUDE COMPARED
238
In an unusual case, a condominium building was built on land that was
owned by persons other than the owners of the condominium. The land was
burdened with a predial servitude in favor of the condominiums.2 39 An annual
fee was charged by the servient estate to the condominium-dominant estate to
sustain the predial servitude. The issue in the case was whether the owners of
the condominiums had a right to a homestead exemption. The Tax Commission
argued on appeal that the fee charged created a lease,2" and, thus, no home-
stead exemption would be available.
The court rejected that proposition by noting that a lease is a personal
obligation running in favor of the lessee whereas the predial servitude is a real
obligation that runs with the land. Further, a predial servitude has no term
whereas a lease has a term, conventional or legal. Finally, the court noted that
a fee is a valid charge on a predial servitude and that fee does not convert a
servitude to a lease. Thus, the court concluded that a predial servitude for which
an annual fee is charged is not a lease.24'
The result in One River Place Condominium Association is undoubtedly
changed by the 1993 amendment to Article VII, section 20(A)(1) of the
Louisiana Constitution. That amendment provides in part that a homestead
exemption for a primary residence is available to the owner of the primary
residence whether "the homeowner owns the land upon which the home ... is
built. '2 42
235. See generally Armstrong, supra note *, Ch. 13.
236. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Kaplan, 147 B.R. 96, 100 (D. Del. 1992).
237. Id. at 100-01.
238. See Armstrong, supra note *, § 1.32a.
239. One River Place Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Mitchell, 609 So. 2d 942 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992), writ denied, 612 So. 2d 81 (1993).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 947-49.
242. 1993 La. Acts No. 1046, § I (amending La. Const. art. VII, § 20(A)(1)).
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